This monograph questions the soundness of Edmund Gettier’s criticism to the sufficiency of what has been known as the “traditional” analysis of knowledge. This analysis states that knowledge is justified, true belief, and Gettier, in his famous article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, proposes a series of counter-examples that seemly comply with the three conditions just stated, but cannot be considered knowledge. The monograph explores two main strategies to reply to Gettier: on the one hand, one can question whether the counterexamples really comply with the three conditions. I argue that Gettier’s counterexamples are unsolvably flawed in that they cannot comply with the “belief” condition and thus, are no threat to the traditional analysis of knowledge, nor proof of its insufficiency. On the other hand, even if one could accept the soundness of the counterexamples, one could still question its relevance. That is what I intent to do on the second half of this work. I try to show that a solution to Gettier’s problem does not improve at all our research methodology, nor changes in any way the way we acquire our beliefs and our knowledge in general. Hence, Gettier’s counterexamples, even if they could function properly (which I defend in the first part of the monograph they do not) are irrelevant and not a real threat to the traditional analysis of knowledge. The monograph intents to accomplish then a dissolution, rather than a solution, of Gettier´s problem.
