The research focuses on the principle of difference as part of the second principle of justice proposed by John Rawls in his theory of justice. The intention is to examine the main criticisms that this principle has received over the years, but at the same time to make a rigorous examination of its theoretical content in order to have a broad context of the problems that revolve around it. In this sense, the principle can be conceived as a kind of guide to regulate and justify social inequalities, since its strict formulation does not speak of equality of wealth or income, but economic and social inequalities must be structured in such a way that they have a greater benefit for the less advantaged people of society. The other component of the second principle of justice is the criterion of fair equality of opportunities for access to positions and functions of recognition, to arrive at a vision of justice as equity whose purpose is to fulfill the expectations of a distributive justice in the society.In this way, the thesis that will be defended is that, despite the various criticisms of the principle of difference, it can be justified from a moral point of view within the framework of a pluralistic society based on the principles of freedom, equality and solidarity.
