This thesis presents a static analysis of the decision issued on June 2, 2021, within the framework of the extraordinary appeal for the annulment of awards, identified by the registration number 2020-00048-00 (66031). In this judgment, Subsection B of the Third Section of the Council of State invoked the seventh ground specified in Article 41 of Law 1563 of 2012, which pertains to “fault in conscience or equity, having to have been in law”. (ex bono et aequo). The debate centers on whether this ground has been used to conduct a substantive analysis of the arbitral award, a scenario previously unobserved within the context of this appeal. The specific legal issue examined in this thesis is as follows: Has Subsection B of the Third Section of the Council of State, through the ground of fault in conscience or equity outlined in numeral 7 of Article 41 of Law 1563 of 2012, created an avenue to scrutinize substantive matters, thus undermining the legally established distinction between the form and substance of the arbitral award? The thesis presents and defends two arguments. First, it asserts that the judicial decision weakens the normative character of the extraordinary appeal for annulment and the normative framework of arbitration by blurring the line between the substance and the form, a distinction fundamental to the design of the arbitration process. Secondly, it suggests that this decision is part of a broader trend the author of this research terms 'revisionism of awards,' wherein the tutela action against arbitral awards serves a similar purpose. To answer the problem under study, an analysis of both phenomena is carried out using Critical Legal Studies as a theoretical framework.
