The purpose of this investigation is to combine the thesis of two authors who, at first, seem different in their philosophical approaches: Levinas and Benjamin. I claim that they agree on some points. I will show this by considering the question on whether it is possible to extend the notion of the Levinasian face to the victims of the past, since both authors assume -in their own way- a commitment to them. Thus, in order to respond to an ethical condition present in the subjects, Levinas suggests that the fundamental and constitutive structure of the subject is to live attending to the questioning and responsibility that emerges from the presence of the Other. On the other hand, Benjamin begins with presupossitions that warn that we must answer for the past in virtue of its redemption and that of present. This work has the following structure. (i) Present a certain framework of understanding that implies proposing a fundamental responsibility of the present towards the past. ii) Carry out a general reconstruction of the main concepts of Levinas, iii) Reorient the concept of face to make an opening now aimed at thinking about a possible missing face. Finally, iv) by exposing the main concepts -under a <<deconstructive>> strategy- I suggest a theoretical approach that consists in safeguarding a responsibility towards the absent and the corresponding need to save signs from the past by elaborating certain grammars that contribute to that purpose.
