Un instrument de court terme pour stimuler la concurrence le gas release Academic Article


  • This paper develops a simple model for examining the gas-release programs as the unique tool to improve the performance of imperfectly competitive natural gas markets. We study the «artificial» duopoly effect created by first the incumbent and then by a regulator who introduces a gas-release program under both a partial and a global budget-balance constraint imposed on the incumbent. Calibration and simulation techniques are used to compare these scenarios under different assumptions on the way regulation is conducted.

publication date

  • 2008/1/1


  • 59


  • Budget balance
  • Calibration
  • Duopoly
  • Gas
  • Gas market
  • Incumbents
  • Natural gas
  • Scenarios
  • Simulation

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0035-2764

number of pages

  • 12

start page

  • 475

end page

  • 486