Informed entry in auctions Academic Article


  • International Journal of Game Theory


  • We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude.

publication date

  • 2018-3-1


  • 47


  • Auctions
  • Costs
  • English Auction
  • Exceed
  • First-price Auction
  • Participation
  • Participation Costs
  • Willingness-to-pay
  • auction
  • costs
  • participation
  • potential bidder
  • willingness to pay

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0020-7276

number of pages

  • 31

start page

  • 175

end page

  • 205