In this paper an analysis is made of the conception of autonomy that underlies the proposal of citizenship competences developed by the Ministry of National Education of Colombia. The thesis that is proposed is that there is a deficit with respect to the formulation or argumentation of personal autonomy in the proposal of said competences, which obstructs or hinders its central purpose, namely: that future citizens develop a moral autonomy that motivates them to adjust their conduct in accordance to the community and democratic ideals expressed in the constitution of 1991.To that end, in the first part, a reconstruction is made of the proposal of the citizenship competences, and so is made an analysis of some of the critical studies that have been done about them, this with objective of: first, identifying the conceptions of autonomy and moral development present in citizenship competences; second, showing how insaid proposal there isn’t enough clarity with respect to the distinction between moral and personal autonomy and; third, clarifying how this two forms of autonomy are put together to achieve the goals of moral development. The second part is concerned with discussing, based on the theses of Jeremy Waldron, Thomas Hill Jr., Carlos Nino and Rainer Forst, the distinction between personal and moral autonomy. This with the objective of arguing in favor of the idea that states that, the emphasis that is made in the proposal of citizenshipcompetences favors a conception of moral autonomy. In the third part a reading is proposed of the theory of social-relational autonomy developed by Marina Oshana, with the goal of trying out a theoretical alternative that would overcome the deficit in the argumentation of citizenship competence.
