El problema de la referencia vacía de términos universales en Ockham: un estudio proposicional desde la teoría de las descripciones de Bertrand Russell
Thesis
The overall objective of this monograph is to perform an analysis of those propositions that contain significant gaps of universal reference, analysis that part of the theory of the assumption of William of Ockham and the theory of descriptions of Bertrand Russell. Seeks to address the question: how can a proposition such as I found myself with a unicorn be meaningful, even when there is nothing that relates to the description of 'unicorn? The analysis is done by examining the referential character of the universal terms and propositions from the theories mentioned above of Ockham and the descriptions of Russell. The latter is compatible and provides a solution in part to the question raised in the empty reference of universal terms. The development of this monograph is divided into three parts. In the first part provides a systematic reconstruction of the philosophical problem of the universals, emphasizing the issue of the reference of such terms as it stands in the theory of the significance exposed in the amount of logic of Ockham. In the second there is an analysis of the universal terms and propositions, on the basis of the work the philosophy of logical atomism of Russell. Finally, it discusses the universal terms with empty reference that form part of the propositions of the form a such and such and that constitute the solution that gives Russell in his theory of descriptions to the problem posed in the theory of the assumption of Ockham.
