Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint Academic Article


  • Social Choice and Welfare


  • © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014.We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.

publication date

  • 2014/1/1


  • Budget constraint
  • Government
  • Guarantee
  • Owners
  • Strategic behavior
  • budget
  • guarantee
  • money
  • welfare

International Standard Serial Number (ISSN)

  • 0176-1714

number of pages

  • 31

start page

  • 603

end page

  • 633