Permissioned blockchain in a supply chain problem

This thesis shows the importance of considering technologies such as blockchain to identify an information improvement process in a supply chain problem. We propose an extension of the paper ”Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption” (Iyengar et al. 2020) where the number of consumers is discrete. This extension provides comparative statics of the consumer’s and manufacturer’s welfare under the adoption or non-adoption of the technology. We confirm the results of the original paper regarding the challenges of successful adoption, but with specific results respecting the importance of the size of the market (number of consumers) and the distribution of manufacturers among low and high- quality types. Furthermore, we show the advantages that this technology can offer through the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance consensus (PBFT) that guarantees the correctness of the information. Finally, using a two-sided markets model we provide a preliminary setup of a fee system that creates incentives to enter the platform: the blockchain network. Our results suggest that implementing blockchain improves the consumer’s welfare, while the manufacturer’s welfare varies depending on the quality of the product they offer in the market. In addition, we analyze a consensus mechanism to reduce information asymmetries and the restructuring of the problem as a model of two-sided markets.

VIVO
VIVO